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Abstract
We establish a Theorem on Structural Inequality Indices which provides fundamen-
tal link between inequality measurement and a concept of social justice embedded in
meritocracy framework by taking axiomatic approach and redefining standard proper-
ties of inequality indices in a way that incorporates meritocracy, in particular equality of
opportunity concept of Roemer (1998). Taking into account recent proof Benabou(2000)
that meritocracy contributes positively to growth, which break the conventional trade off
between equity and efficiency, the theorem provides for their connection with the theory
of inequality measurement. If an index is to be both an inequality index and merito-
cratic it has to be of a form given in our theorem. We then propose a two-dimensional
measure of meritocratic inequality index and discuss its advantages over standard Gini
index and in reflecting better the nature of inequality in a society.
JEL classification: D63, D71
Keywords: inequality measurement, equality of opportunity, meritocracy, social
welfare
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide a formal structure for judging on what normative
grounds equality of income is justified. In economic literature it has been often argued
that there is a trade off between equity and efficiency. The problem is also a hotly
debated issue in public discourse and often a reason for unwillingness of richer classes to
transfer resources to the allegedly lazy ones. Indeed, a society usually will not consider
as fair a transfer from a hard-working richer person to a lazy poor if the latter lacks
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only willingness, not possibilities, to earn more. However, as Benabou (2000) shows,
the conventional trade off between equity and efficiency is no longer valid in case when
meritocracy (which covers both equality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes) is
taken into account.1 Whereas economists often argue that equity does not consider the
so called ”size of the cake”, the critique does not apply to meritocracy. In Benabou’s
dynamic heterogeneous agent economy setting, equalizing the young’s opportunities for
human-capital investment enhances both social mobility and the growth of aggregate
output. Both dimensions of meritocracy contribute positively to growth.
Inequality measurement theory seems to exist in isolation of these results and modern
social justice theory concepts. These links need to be established as inequality measure-
ment is largely considered a settled issue and its applications are vast. First, this is the
aim of this paper to provide for such. Secondly, a unified framework of both theories
would, on one hand, enrich normative content of inequality indices and allow for a more
precise picture of the nature of inequality in a society2, on the other hand, it will sup-
port meritocracy concept with consistent inequality measures, that is, measures that
are bound to fulfill standard inequality measurement axioms.
We develop a framework that unifies the theory of inequality measurement and mer-
itocracy paradigm by taking axiomatic approach. Before we proceed to explain this, we
need a definition of meritocracy we will refer to. We employ a two-dimensional definition
of meritocracy similar to Benabou’s (2000), however we add a significant interpretative
change to Benabou’s understanding of equality of opportunity (EOP). It now reflects to
what extent not only talent and market luck, but also effort is a determinant of income
relative to background. This is much closer to the very concept of equalizing opportu-
nities as proposed originally by Roemer (1998). Notice that had we done it Benabou’s
way, there would virtually be no room for people’s own decisions on how hard to try to
achieve outcomes. For talent as well as market luck are given. Effort reinforces talent and
all what constitutes person’s merits. Therefore we define meritocracy as consisting of
two main concepts: Equality of opportunity (EOP): the extent to which person’s effort,
talent or market luck rather than background is a determinant of income or rewards
Inequality of outcomes: the extent to which effort or talent is rewarded in a society. Re-
warding effort is considered fair as effort is a person’s choice, thus inequality of outcomes
is also a dimension of meritocracy. A person should not be rewarded or punished for a
set of circumstances that were beyond his or her control and this is formulated as EOP.
1This will be defined later in the text.
2In particular, the meritocratic index of inequality should be sensitive to the kind of transfers we described
earlier in a section.
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In accordance with Roemer’s method, such defined meritocracy involves categorizing
people based on a set of circumstances and then comparing effort distribution3 in each
percentile as we consider percentile to be an accurate intertype-comparable measure of
effort.
As it has been already stated, in order to link two theories we employ a general
axiomatic approach. Standard properties of inequality indices are redefined in a way
that incorporates group categorizing and group comparison characteristic to meritoc-
racy concept as this is our main interest. However, since the approach is general it allows
for associating inequality measurement theory with other social choice theory concepts,
which have the similar underlying logical structure. We call redefined properties struc-
tural as they relate to the group structure characteristic of meritocracy framework.
After redefining the axioms we establish a theorem saying that structural inequality
properties are met if and only if the overall inequality index is an aggregation function
of the indices in groups. Structural inequality index, hence its specific example we call
meritocratic inequality index, are inherently group decomposable, which is a desirable
characteristic of an inequality index. Since we use axioms that are standard for inequality
indices and they were redefined to ensure consistency with meritocracy, we consider the
result as minimal and fundamental for the unified framework we aimed to develop. This
is the main result of the article. It says that if you want an inequality index to have a
coherent meritocratic content and meaning, its structure has to be the same as imposed
by the theorem.
Based on the result, we propose an inequality measure that is very intuitive for both
equality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes. We investigate its properties against
standard inequality indices. To make it normatively significant we construct a social
welfare function (SWF) connected with it. The embedded implicit value judgements are
quite similar to Gini’s SWF, but in our measure even greater welfare weight is associated
with the income of a poorer individual.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 1 standard axioms of inequality theory
are redefined and explained. Section 2 includes main result, that is, a theorem linking
two above mentioned theories, we call it A Theorem on Structural Inequality Indices. In
Section 3 we define a specific meritocratic inequality index and investigate its properties
against Gini index. Four examples are studied, two show consistency of our measure with
Gini and the other two do not. We argue that in cases of inconsistency Gini is to a large
part irrelevant in picturing inequalities whereas meritocratic inequality index is not. We
3For those not familiar with Roemer’s method, the procedure leads to justifying outcomes, that is, usually
income distributions, as reflecting effort only.
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also construct SWF and interpret value judgements involved. Section 4 concludes.
2 Properties of structural inequality indices
2.1 Standard axioms
Standard properties of inequality indices are the following (see e.g.: Dutta (2002)) :
• An index of inequality is a function I : Rn+ 7→ R, where R
n
+ stands for a domain, a
set of income distributions corresponding to a population of size n. I is a continuous
and strictly S − convex function. 4
• Lorenz dominance: Let L denote Lorenz curve, that is, L(x, p) is the income accru-
ing to the 100l% poorest individuals in x ∈ Rn+ for l ∈ (0, 1). For x, y ∈ R
n
+, we say
x Lorenz dominates y and denote it by xLy, if L(x, l) ­ L(y, l) for all l ∈ (0, 1),
with strict inequality for some l.
• Pigou-Dalton Transfer: Given x, y ∈ Rn+, x is obtained from y by a progressive
transfer if x − y = δ(ei − ej) for δ > 0, and yj > xi > yi, where ei denotes the
i-th standard basis vector. Inequality index satisfies the Pigou-Dalton Transfer
principle if for x, y ∈ Rn+, I(x) < I(y), whenever x is obtained from y by means of
a progressive transfer.
• Symmetry: Inequality index satisfies Symmetry principle if I(x) = I(piy) for all x
and all permutation matrices pi.
• Ratio Scale Invariance: Index of inequality satisfies Ratio Scale Invariance if I(x) =
I(λx) for all λ > 0
It is well known that symmetry and Pigou-Dalton Transfer are together equivalent to
strict S-convexity (Sen, Foster (1997)).
2.2 Standard axioms redefined
Before we proceed with redefining the above described standard axioms of inequality
indices we explain why these axioms are not suitable for our unified framework.
Let us consider S-convexity first. In order to be consistent with meritocracy concept, in
particular its EOP part in accordance with Roemer, we partition people in groups based
on a set of characteristics. To keep the discussion simple, let us assume there is just one
4A function f : Rn+ 7→ R is S− convex if and only if f(Qy) ¬ f(y) for all y ∈ R
n
+ and all n×n bistochastic
matrices Q. Strict convexity requires inequality whenever Qy is not a permutation of y.
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circumstance beyond people’s control which determines incomes, namely sex. Assume
also that in a society we consider, being a men raises chances of higher future wages,
which is a quite realistic assumption anyway. Then if we multiply an income distribution
by a bi-stochastic matrix5, this may involve transfers from women who tried hard to earn
a lot (using our intertype-effort measure they are in a higher centile of the effort distri-
bution) to men who did not and therefore earn less. We do not want then meritocratic
index of inequality to show less inequalities in this society! Thus we need to develop a
definition of S-convexity which excludes such transfers. We call it structural S-convexity
since it is supposed to be relating to the underlying structure of group categorizing. This
example is studied thoroughly in Section 3. It is pathological with respect to the Lorenz
dominance too. We call a new criterion structural Lorenz dominance. Analysis concern-
ing Pigou-Dalton Transfer and Symmetry follows the same lines and is left to the reader.
Last axiom, Ratio Scale Invariance is also irrelevant in meritocracy context. A proper
meritocratic measure should be invariant with respect to group scaling. For instance, if
we scale up wages of all women, the inequality measure should be invariant to scaling in
this particular group, namely women. However, one can say, definitely women enjoy now
better or less worse position than men. This can be reflected by other measures which are
invariant to other group categorization e.g. percentiles instead of categorization based
on sex.
With normative justification for rejection of standard definitions of axioms, we are
now equipped well enough to construct new ones. These are given below.
Denote P a finite partition of X (usual conditions are fulfilled), xp will denote a
distribution of x ∈ X corresponding to p ∈ P .
(S1) I is a strictly structural S-convex function compatible with P if
∀x∈Rn
+
I(Mx) ­ I(x), (1)
for any stochastic matrix M such that i ∈ p1 ∧ j ∈ p2 ∧ p1 6= p2 =⇒ Mij = 0 and
the inequality is sharp if M is not a permutation matrix.
5There is a bi-stochasting matrix in the definition of S-convexity.
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(S2) I fulfills structural ratio scale invariance compatible with P if
I(y) = I(x), (2)
whenever for all p ∈ P there exist λp > 0 such that yp = λpxp.
Next axiom is not a standard property of inequality axioms. It is added for technical
reason to exclude pathological cases when ordering of income distributions in one group
would inevitably impose ordering in others.6 This axiom is independent of other axioms.
(S3) I fulfills structural consistency compatible with P if for any p ∈ P
I(x) ¬ I(x˜)⇔ I(y) ¬ I(y˜), (3)
whenever xp = yp, x˜p = y˜p and for all q 6= p xp = x˜p and yp = y˜p
Below redefined are next two standard axioms of inequality measurement.
(S4) I fulfills structural symmetry compatible with P if
∀xI(Hx) = I(x), (4)
for any permutation matrix H such that i ∈ p1 ∧ j ∈ p2 ∧ p1 6= p2 =⇒ Hij = 0.
(S5) We say that x Lorenz dominate in a structural sense compatible with P y and
denote it by yLsx if
∀p∈PypLxp, (5)
where L denotes the standard Lorentz dominance.
(S6) We say that x was obtained from y by means of a structural progressive transfer
compatible with P if for all p ∈ P , xp can be obtained by means of a progressive
transfer from yp.
I fulfills structural Pigou-Dalton transfer principle compatible with P if for I(x) <
I(y) whenever x was obtained from y by a structural progressive transfer.
3 Theorem on Structural Inequality Indices
The first three of redefined axioms impose a specific form on inequality indexes, for
which reason we call these indices structural.
6Such cases of contradictory orderings are often treated and resolved in social choice theory, however this
is not of our prime interest here.
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Theorem 3.1 (On Structural Inequality Indices). Let P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}. As-
sume that a continuous function I fulfills (S1),(S2),(S3) then I can be represented as
I(x) = f (ip1(xp1), ip2(xp2), . . . , ipn(xpn)) , (6)
where ipk are ratio scale invariant indices and f is a strictly increasing function with
respect to each coordinate. ipk provided by such decomposition are unique up to an in-
creasing transformation.
Conversely, if I is of the form (6) then it fulfils (S1),(S2),(S3).
Proof. Fix z ∈ Rn+ and for p ∈ P define
ip(y) = I(z|py), (7)
where z|py is z with p part replaced by y. By assumptions (S1),(S2) it is straightforward
to check that ip is a ratio scale invariant index. From assumption (S3) it follows that
the indices iˆp’s defined by the above procedure for any reference vector zˆ 6= x˜ are
consistent with ip’s in a sense that each of them is an increasing transformation of the
corresponding ip.
Assumption (S3) ensures that for ip’s defined above
f (ip1(xp1), ip2(xp2), . . . , ipn(xpn)) = I(x) (8)
is a valid definition of f on the domain D = Im(ip1)×Im(ip2)×. . .×Im(ipn) (where Im
denoted the image of a function). This will be shown once we prove that for any a, b such
that ∀pk∈P ∧ ipk(apk) = ipk(bpk) we have I(a) = I(b). Denote x := z|p1ap1 , x˜ := z|p1bp1 ,
y := a, y˜ := a|p1bp1 . Definition of ip1 implies that I(x) = I(x˜) and consequently by (S3)
I(y) = I(y˜). Next we define a sequence y˜k := y˜|pkbpk taking for y˜1 = y˜. (S3) implies
that I(y˜k+1) = I(y˜k), notice that y˜n = b, hence finally I(a) = I(b).
Assume that we have another decomposition
I(x) = g (jp1(xp1), jp2(xp2), . . . , jpn(xpn))
consider ip1 and jp1 . By assumption that f, g are strictly increasing for any x, y we
have ip1(x) ­ ip1(y) ⇔ jp1(x) ­ jp1(y). Hence h(jp1) = ip1 is a valid definition of an
increasing function.
The converse part is obvious and left to the reader.
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The theorem establishes an elegant characterization and representation of a function
that is both an inequality index and is meritocratic. The application of a meritocratic
index to inequality measurement broadens the knowledge about the nature of inequality
in a society, since the index also uses the information about inequalities within and
between groups that are categorized in accordance with some normatively significant
concepts, in our case it is meritocracy. Axiom (S6) is fulfilled by structural S-convexity
and axiom (S5) by Atkinson’s theorem (Atkinson (1970)).
4 Meritocracy in opportunities and meritocracy
in outcomes
4.1 Meritocratic inequality indices
Based on the result of Theorem on Structural Inequality Indices we propose a specific
structural inequality index that reflects well the concept of meritocracy as described
in the Introduction. We employ a two-dimensional measure, each dimension represent-
ing one part of the definition of meritocracy. Following Benabou (2000), we call them
meritocracy in opportunities and meritocracy in outcomes.
The first definition concerns equality of opportunities. In accordance with John Roe-
mer’s method we categorize groups based on a set of circumstances, which a society views
as being beyond people’s control, a sort of background characteristics. Based on EOP
literature we claim that equalizing opportunities means that people who tried the same
should be treated the same. We are interested with a measure which judges a degree of
equalizing opportunities in a society. We call this measure meritocracy in opportunities
index.
In below by G(x) we will denote the standard Gini index of income distribution x.
Defintion 4.1. Meritocracy in opportunities Let x ∈ Rn denotes income distribu-
tion in a society partitioned according to P . Let yp = {q
i
p : i ∈ P} where q
i
p is p-th
percentile in i-th group of P . Mopp denotes meritocracy in opportunities index and is
defined by
Mopp(x) :=
√∫
1
0
G(yp)2dp. (9)
Remark 4.1. The equation (9) is not very handy in applications, hence we will use
Mopp(x) :=
√
Σ100p=1G(yp)
2
100
. (10)
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which well approximates (9).
The second definition concerns inequality of outcomes. This property is desirable only
if it rewards effort by strengthening incentives. For this to hold we should concentrate
on groups categorized according to background characteristics and then construct an
index that measures to what extent society encourages effort, or in other words, rewards
effort. We call such a maesure meritocracy in outcomes index.
Defintion 4.2. Meritocracy in outcomes Let x ∈ Rn denotes income distribution in
a society partitioned according to P . Mout denotes meritocracy in outcomes index and
is defined by
Mout(x) :=
√
Σi∈P (1−G(xi))2
|P |
, (11)
where xi is the distribution of income x in group i and |P | is number of groups.
4.2 Properties of meritocratic inequality indices
We will now study the behavior of our measures in relation to standard Gini index, as this
should give us an intuition about Mopp and Mout. We will do this by considering exam-
ples in which our measures and standard Gini are compatible and in which they are not,
justifying that using meritocratic index gives a better picture of the nature of inequalities
in a society. Of course since Mopp and 1−Mout are both of the form as a general struc-
tural inequality index (the aggregation function takes the form f(G1, G2, ..., G100) =√
Σ100i=1(Gi)
2 in case of Mopp and f(G1, G2, ..., Gk) = 1 −
√
Σki=1(1−Gi)
2 in case of
1−Mout) they fulfill the structural standard axioms.
Example 1 Consider two societies with two groups and the following distribution of
incomes:
• Society 1: men - N (150, 10); women - N (100, 10)
Then G = 0.107; Mopp = 0.101; Mout = 0.985
• Society 2: men - N (170, 10); women - N (120, 10)
Then G = 0.092; Mopp = 0.087; Mout = 0.987
Here, Mopp is consistent with Gini index, which is not surprising as in Society 2 both
groups have higher incomes on average and the variance is preserved. In each percentile
the distribution then did not change, up to the mean. As to Mout, in each group in-
equalities are lower, which since we excluded background determinants of income, means
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effort is rewarded less now. This makes Mout go up and it is reasonable not to consider
less inequalities better as it distorts people’s incentives.
Example 2 Consider two societies with two groups and the following distribution of
incomes:
• Society 1: men - N (150, 10); women - N (100, 10)
Then G = 0.107; Mopp = 0.101; Mout = 0.985
• Society 2: men - N (140, 10); women - N (110, 10)
Then G = 0.067; Mopp = 0.067; Mout = 0.986
Here, Mopp and Gini are lower than in Example 1, because we make two groups less
distant and this lowers Mopp.
Example 3 Consider two societies with two groups and the following distribution of
incomes:
• Society 1: men - N (200, 10); women - N (180, 10)
Then G = 0.0309; Mopp = 0.0270; Mout = 0.990
• Society 2: men - N (200, 100); women - N (190, 100)
Then G = 0.0321; Mopp = 0.0151; Mout = 0.971
Income variance changed a lot in both groups and this makes standard Gini go up,
though the income averages in both groups are now closer. The latter effect is reflected
by Mopp, which decreases. Thanks to using Mopp, we can spot otherwise unobservable
phenomenon that apart from large variance, differences in outcomes between people who
try the same lowered. Here we can see best that picture of inequalities as measured by
Gini only is incomplete.
Example 4 Now we consider an example similar to the one described in Section
2. We have two societies with two groups: women and men and assume being a men
raises chance of higher earnings. Now we transfer income from hard-working women
and therefore earning more (mean 40) to lazy men (mean 30). This is shown below in
pictures 1 and 2. Gini index decreased as we transferred money from rich to poor, so
the transfer is progressive, in response to what Gini has to go down. However, based on
our meritocratic values, we do not consider such a transfer fair! And this exactly what
increasing Mopp informs us about.
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Figure 1: Distribution of income before transfer
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(a) Men
10 20 30 40 50
(b) Wemen
Then G = 0.191; Mopp = 0.0907; Mout = 0.829
Figure 2: Distribution of income after transfer
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
(a) Men
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
(b) Wemen
Then G = 0.1796; Mopp = 0.124; Mout = 0.861
Figure 3: Lorenz curve (blue - before transfer, purple - after transfer)
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4.3 Social Welfare Function of meritocratic inequality in-
dices
Both Mopp and Mout are normatively significant, in a sense that whenever each of them
shows higher/lower values, social welfare function shows also higher/lower values. SWF
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connected with our measures is of the form:7
W (x) = Φ((1−Mopp(x))µ(x)), (12)
where Φ is an arbitrary increasing transformation, µ(x) is the mean of the income dis-
tribution x and for Mopp the formula is identical with one exception. Instead of Mout,
we have Mopp in equation and Φ is a decreasing transformation. It is difficult to find
a clear-cut interpretation of this specific SWF, however some value judgements can be
traced. It is known Gini index is connected with a kind of SWF that associate greater
welfare weights with poorer individuals. Since we take a quadratic transformations of
Gini’s in groups this will ”favor” groups with larger differentiation as compared to stan-
dard Gini measure. In case of Mopp we can conclude that it is particularly sensitive to
groups where inequalities are large comparing to others. WithMout the logic is reversed,
it will additionally weigh down poorer individuals. This is a reasonable interpretation
as they are considered as having abilities and opportunities, but unwilling to work.
5 Conclusions
The trade off between equity and efficiency is one of the cornerstones of economic lit-
erature. The recent advancements such as meritocracy and, in particular, equality of
opportunity frameworks, break this traditionally unresolved tie, proving that redistri-
bution of incomes is often efficient. On the other hand, the measurement of inequality
exists out of touch with modern social justice theory. In this paper we established a
theorem which imposes a functional form on inequality indices which are to be meri-
tocratic, but can cover other concepts as well provided that their logical structure is
similar to meritocracy concept. The theorem founds two theories, meritocracy and in-
equality measurement, with basic interrelations. Based on the theorem, we propose a
two-dimensional meritocratic inequality index and and present its advantages over Gini
index. Value judgements embedded in our measure are close to Gini’s, but the more
underlie inequalities the larger they are. Meritocratic inequality index should be further
studied in relation to other standard indices.
7This characterization is easy to derive with very well know formula for Atkinson-Kolm-Sen index (Dutta
(2002)).
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